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Is There Rent Sharing in Italy?  
Evidence from Employer-Employee Data 
Alessia Matano1, Paolo Naticchioni2 
Abstract 
Using a unique employer-employee panel database, we investigate the extent of rent sharing in Italy from 
1996 to 2003. We derive the following findings. First, after controlling for the national bargaining level, 
there is robust evidence of rent sharing at firm level. Second, by means of fixed effects estimates we show 
that the sorting of high-ability workers into high-profit firms appears to play a substantial role, since it 
captures a significant amount of cross sectional estimates of rent sharing. Third, in accordance to the 
related literature the endogeneity of profits causes a severe underestimation of rent sharing. Our final IV 
estimate of the elasticity of wages with respect to profits per employee amounts to 6%, with a “Lester” 
range of 24%. Moreover, we point out that the impact of rent sharing is not homogeneous across several 
dimensions (gender, occupation, sector and macroarea). 
JEL Classifications: C33, J31, J41, L25. 
Keywords: Rent Sharing, Sorting, Wage, Italy. 
1. Introduction3 
Competitive labour market models predict no relationship between profits and 
wages at firm level: firms are wage-takers and face a horizontal labour supply. Therefore, 
if a firm becomes more profitable there is no reason why it should pay higher wages. 
However, non-competitive theories, such as efficiency wages models and bargaining 
theories, predict that there might be a positive relationship between wages and profits. 
In particular, rent sharing models underline that wages result from a bargain between 
the employer and the employees which generates a long-run positive relationship 
between wages and profits. In this setting, wages are determined by workers’ outside 
options, by quasi-rent (firm profits evaluated at the opportunity cost of labour) and by 
relative bargaining power of the parties involved (Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the existence and the extent of rent sharing 
in Italy. We make use of a unique employer-employee database from 1996 to 2003, 
constructed by merging the INPS employer-employee database with the AIDA 
database, which contains information on the balance sheet of capital-owned firms. As a 
result of this merger, we are forced to restrict our analysis to this type of firm. We 
estimate a wage equation that includes the quasi-rent variable, which is the proxy for 
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rent sharing. We also take into account several issues that have been proved to be 
relevant in order to get reliable estimates of rent sharing (Martins, 2009). More 
specifically, we control for the correlation between profits and workers’ unobserved 
heterogeneity as well as for firm characteristics and for the endogeneity between profits 
and wages. Moreover, our data take into account the fact that wage setting in Italy is the 
outcome of bargaining at two different levels: a first centralized (national) level where 
minimum wages for all occupations are set in all industries (with even more than a 
national contract for the same industry); a second decentralized level where the 
employer and employees (or unions at firm level) bargain the wages over the constraints 
imposed by national contracts. Therefore, we introduce in our estimation dummies that 
controls for the type of national contract applied to each worker. This turns out to be a 
more reliable and accurate measure for the first level of bargaining with respect to using 
industry dummies, as usually done in the empirical literature, since the national 
bargaining occurs at the national contract level and not at the industry level.  
The starting point of our empirical strategy is to use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates, deriving an elasticity of wages with respect to quasi-rents per employee of 
around 6.8%, with a Lester range of 27%. After controlling for the first level of 
bargaining there is still a substantial role for rent sharing at the firm level: coefficient 
estimates are in fact reduced to around 15%, a finding in line with Arai (2003) and Arai 
and Heyman (2001) who point out that most of rent sharing takes place at firm level. 
We then move to the fixed effect estimates to control for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity. We find out that the sorting of high-ability workers into high-profit firms 
plays a substantial role (see Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2010, Arai and Heyman, 2001, 
Margolis and Salvanes, 2001, Martins, 2009), since estimates are significantly reduced.  
Finally, we take into account endogeneity issues, by applying IV estimates: we 
derive an elasticity of wages with respect to profits of 6% with a “Lester” range of 
variation in wages between unprofitable and profitable firm of 24%
4. We also look at 
the impact of quasi-rents on wages across several dimensions (gender, occupation, 
macroarea and economic activity) pointing out that the degree of rent sharing is strongly 
heterogeneous. In particular, we show that rent sharing is higher for males than for 
females, for white collars than for blue collars, in the service sector compared to 
manufacturing, and in the Southern regions.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the theoretical as 
well as the empirical literature concerning the relationship between profits and wages. In 
Section 3 we describe the data we use throughout the empirical analyses. Section 4 
discusses the empirical specification and presents the main results. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
4 The “Lester” range is defined as the elasticity of wages with respect to quasi-rent multiplied by four 
times the ratio between the standard deviation of quasi-rent and mean quasi-rent. It gives us a measure 
of how much the wage of a worker increases moving from a firm at the bottom of the profit 
distribution (two standard deviation below the mean) to a firm at the top of the profit distribution (two 
standard deviations above the mean). Lester (1952).  
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2. Related Literature 
Standard competitive theories predict that there is no relationship between wages 
and profits at firm level, since wages are determined by labour market conditions and 
firms have no incentives to pay wages over the level set in the labour market. However, 
non-competitive theories underline that such a relationship can actually exists, i.e. that 
firms may indeed pay a wage over the level set in the labour market. This can occur for 
different reasons. For instance, it is possible that firms pay higher wages than those set 
in the competitive labour market due to efficiency wage arguments (see Shapiro and 
Stiglitz, 1984, Krueger and Summers, 1988). Also, according to bargaining theories, 
profits and wages can move together since employer and employee bargain on wages. 
More specifically, in a bargaining framework, wages at firm level are determined by 
workers’ outside options, by the quasi-rent (firm profits evaluated at the opportunity 
cost of labour) and by the relative bargaining power of the parties involved (Hildreth 
and Oswald, 1997).
5  
As for the empirical evidence, many works studied the existence and the extent of 
rent sharing in different countries, using various methodologies and data at different 
levels. Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) -by 
using respectively firm level (for UK) and industry level data matched with individual 
data (for US)- provide evidence in favour of an important positive relationships between 
profits and wages, controlling for observed work heterogeneity and firm characteristics 
and applying GMM techniques (or using lagged values of profits) to control for the 
endogeneity of profits.  
Other papers used instrumental variables techniques to control for the 
endogeneity of profits, while using firm level data to take into account firm 
heterogeneity. For instance Abowd and Lemieux (1993), in the case of Canada, use 
instruments related to the international performance, namely the industry import and 
export prices, finding a very large degree of underestimation in the extent of rent 
sharing when not controlling for the endogeneity between profits and wages. Van 
Reenen (1996) analyzes the case of the UK using different measures for profits (net 
profits per head, quasi-rents and Tobin Q), and past innovations as instruments. His 
findings suggest a substantial amount of rent sharing in UK, and a severe 
underestimation when not controlling for endogeneity. 
More recently, various papers have made use of matched employer-employee 
panel data in order to control for the unobserved worker heterogeneity. Margolis and 
Salvanes (2001) investigate the case of France and Norway. They apply IV techniques 
using as instruments sales and operating subsidies, finding relevant rent sharing only in 
the case of Norway. For the case of France they show that when taking into account the 
unobserved individual characteristics in the IV estimation, rent sharing estimates turn 
out to be not significant. Similarly, using employer-employee data Arai (2003) analyzes 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that also within a modified version of the competitive model it is possible that wages 
and profits are positively correlated. In particular, in presence of short-run frictions, such that firms face 
an upward sloping labour supply curve, positive demand shocks might bring to a raise in total firm 
profits and wages (Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). However, in the long-run, wages adjust to the 
competitive level, unless there are mechanisms that prevent this adjustment. Hence, a test for rent 
sharing cannot rest on the evidence of a short-run correlation between profits and wages.   
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the case of Sweden. He uses time-average of lagged values of profits and controls for 
observable firm characteristics to check the relevance of both the rent sharing and of 
other theories (based on efficiency wages and short-run labour market frictions). He 
finds robust evidence of rent sharing in line with bargaining theories, which does not 
differ across different worker categories.
6 In another related paper Arai and Heyman 
(2001) make use of a larger employer-employee matched dataset and apply instrumental 
variable techniques. They use different instruments such as lagged values of profits, 
demand elasticity (based on predicted response in sales due to higher prices) and 
measures indicating the degree of competition in the product market. Their findings 
confirm that rent sharing is underestimated when not controlling for endogeneity and 
greater estimates are provided when demand elasticity is used as instrument. 
Furthermore, they point out that white collar workers extract higher rents than blue 
collar.  
Another interesting related paper is Guertzgen (2009), which focuses on how rent 
sharing is affected by the different levels of bargaining in Germany, using firm-worker 
level data and GMM techniques. He shows that rent sharing is higher where there is no 
union sector coverage and in presence of firm-specific contracts. Moreover, he looks at 
differences among workers’ groups, finding that for blue collar workers rent sharing 
actually disappears under centralized contracts. Also Rusinek and Rycx (2008) analyze 
the impact of different levels of bargaining (industry and firm level) on the extent of 
rent sharing, using an employer-employee database for Belgium, a country where the 
relative importance of industry and firm level agreements (the degree of centralization) 
differs significantly across industries. Their results show that, after controlling for the 
endogeneity of profits and heterogeneity among workers and firms, there is a higher 
degree of rent sharing in decentralized industries. Moreover, in centralized industries, 
rent sharing is observed only for workers covered by a firm agreement.  
Finally, Martins (2009) makes use of matched employer-employee panel data to 
derive evidence of rent sharing for Portugal over the period 1993-1995. His findings 
strongly support the need of taking into account the role of both the unobserved 
individual and firm heterogeneity, since IV estimates (as instruments: the interaction 
between the exchange rate and the share of total exports in sales) could be biased when 
these features are neglected (see Martins, 2007, for a survey of the empirical results and 
methodologies applied).  
As for Italy there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning rent sharing. One of 
the few exceptions is the very recent paper of Card, Devicienti and Maida (2010) that 
analyzes the degree of rent sharing and tests the hold up hypothesis in the region of 
Veneto (Italy) for the period 1995-2001. By using INPS-AIDA matched employer-
employee data, they perform an accurate analysis taking into account all the relevant 
issues to be addressed to identify the extent of rent sharing (the sorting of workers and 
firms and the endogeneity of profits). Their findings show that there is evidence of a 
substantial degree of rent sharing in Veneto, and that profits are shared with workers 
after capital costs are fully deducted from profits. Another work on the Italian case is 
                                                 
6 However, it is worth noting that results of this analysis could be affected by the very small sample size 
compared with other studies that use employer-employee data.   
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Pistoresi and Strozzi (2001), who make use of a factor dynamic analysis to analyze the 
extent of rent sharing in Italy within the microsectors of the Italian basic metal industry 
through the period 1983–98. Their main findings are that rent sharing in Italy arises only 
at the centralized level of wage bargaining, while decentralized wage negotiations do not 
lead to any degree of rent sharing between unions and employers.
7  
These papers are different from ours, since we make use of a unique database for 
the whole Italian economy and analyze the period from 1996 to 2003, thus being able to 
shed light on more recent wage dynamics. Moreover, we also look at the extent of rent 
sharing among different dimensions, which have not been investigated in the case of 
Italy, such as gender, occupation, sector and macroarea.  
3. Data Description 
We use a panel version of the administrative database provided by INPS (Italian 
Social Security Institute) and elaborated by ISFOL.
8 It is a matched employee-employer 
dataset, constructed by merging the INPS employee information for the period 1985-
2003 with the INPS employer information.
9 As far as workers’ characteristics are 
concerned, the database contains individual information such as age, gender, 
occupation, workplace, date of beginning and end of the current contract (if any), the 
national contract, the social security contributions, the worker status (part-time or full-
time), the real gross yearly wage and the number of worked weeks and days. As for 
firms, we have the plant location (province), the number of employees and the sector 
(Ateco91). We focus on male and female workers aged between 15 and 64 (when they 
first enter in the database), working in the industrial and service sectors, both part-time 
(converted in full-time equivalent) and full-time, employed in standard labour market 
contracts: blue collar and white collar workers.
10 
We merge the INPS dataset with detailed data on the balance sheets of the 
(capital-owned) firms where workers are employed, which come from the AIDA 
database from 1996 until 2003. AIDA is a database on Italian firms provided by Bureau 
Van Dijk that contains information on the balance sheet of the firms such as value 
                                                 
7 Other papers that address issues similar to rent-sharing for Italy are Pencavel, Pistaferri, and Schivardi 
(2006) who investigate differences in wages between capital-owned and worker-owned firms and Guiso, 
Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005) who focus on risk sharing and analyze the response in wages to firms 
specific shocks in value added, distinguishing by temporary and permanent shocks.  
8 ISFOL stands for “Institute for the Development of Vocational Training”. The sample scheme has been 
set up to follow individuals born on the 10th of March, June, September and December and therefore 
the proportion of this sample on the Italian employees’ population is approximately of 1/90. 
9 For the information on employers we also make use of the ASIA (“Italian Statistical Archive of 
Operating Firms”) database, provided by ISTAT. This database has been used since 1999, because the 
INPS employer database was not available after 1998. The two databases provide the same set of 
information (firm size and sector). 
10 The sample includes also managers. However, since they account for a relatively small fraction of 
workers in the sample (only about 1%, because most of the managers are not covered by the INPS 
database) we include this category within the white collars.   
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added, profits, sales, production and costs of production.
11 As main independent 
variable we use quasi rent per worker as in Van Reenen (1996) and Card et al. (2010).
12 
We also use real sales per employee in order to carry out IV estimates.
  
The two databases are merged by using as key variable the tax code or the VAT 
number (codice fiscale or partita IVA) of the company. The number of records matched 
with respect to the total number of records in the INPS database is around 47%. 
However, it is worth noting that AIDA contains capital-owned firms with total value of 
production equal or higher than 950.000 euro while INPS data contain workers 
employed in all kinds of companies no matters the legal status and the amount of the 
total value of production. Therefore, the share of non-matched records is due to those 
workers who are employed in other kind of firms or in capital-owned firms with total 
value of production less than 950.000 euro. After the merge, the panel version has been 
constructed considering only one observation per year for each worker. For those 
workers who display more than one observation per year we selected the longest 
available contract in terms of weeks worked. We further eliminated those extreme 
observations below (above) the 1
st (99
th) percentile of the wage and profits per employee 
distribution as well as observations where the difference in the firm size reported in 
AIDA and the one reported in INPS exceeds 200 (in this way the correlation between 
the firm size reported in AIDA and the firm size reported in INPS is equal to 99.97). 
We finally restrict the sample to the 60 major national contracts, to have enough 
variability within each contract cell. The dependent variable in our regressions is the 
(log) real gross weekly wage in euro.
13 Table A1 in the Appendix shows the 
characteristics of the merge.  
We end up with a unique employer-employee panel database constituted by 
84,019 workers for 287,749 observations for the period 1996-2003. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the variables of the analysis. The variables of interest are in 
logarithms. 
                                                 
11 Data have been deflated using the valued added deflator for value added, profits, sales, production and 
costs of production. The value added deflator comes from our elaboration of ISTAT data on regional 
economical accounts and is defined at the sectoral and regional level. The base year is 2002.  
12 Rent per worker evaluated at the opportunity cost of labour, which is defined as the revenue per worker 
(operative income –which equals to net profits- plus the wage bill), minus the alternative wage that we 
proxy with the average industrial wage (Van Reenen, 1996).  
13 Wages have been deflated using as deflator the National Consumer Price Index (FOI index, Indice dei 
Prezzi al Consumo per le Famiglie di Operai e Impiegati, ISTAT). The base year is 2002.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables of the analysis  
Variable Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max
Industry
Log Real Weekly Wage 5.97 0.39 3.92 9.25
Gender 1.30 0.46 1.00 2.00
Age 36.91 10.01 15 71
Age Squared 1,462.85 782.73 225 5,041
Blue Collars 0.63 0.48 0 1
White Collars 0.37 0.48 0 1
Log Firm Size 4.47 1.54 0 10.51
Log Quasi-Rent per Employee 2.61 1.08 -11.78 5.69
Log Real Sales per Employee 5.12 0.85 0.57 10.90
dNorth East 0.30 0.46 0 1
dNorth West 0.40 0.49 0 1
dCentre 0.17 0.38 0 1
dSouth 0.09 0.29 0 1
dIsland 0.03 0.18 0 1
Sectors 39.39 18.72 10 93
Number of Contracts 60.00
Number of Observations 287,749
Number of Workers 84,019  
Source: Panel ISFOL on INPS-AIDA data. 
4. Econometric Analysis 
4.1 Econometric Strategy 
In this section we aim at estimating the rents shared by the workers using the 
INPS-AIDA employer-employee database from 1996-2003. The baseline wage equation 
is the following:  
     (1) 
where i stands for individuals, j for firm, s to sector, t to time and l stands for type of 
contract. The dependent variable Wi,j,t is the logarithm of the real weekly wage. I_Chari,t 
stands for a set of individual characteristics such as sex, age, age squared and 
occupational categories (blue collars and white collars). Firmsizej(i),t is the logarithm of the 
size of the firm j where the worker i is employed and it is a proxy for firm heterogeneity. 
DCONTRl(i),t is a set of dummy variables indicating the kind of national contract l a 
worker is subject to. QRj(i),t is our variable of interest, the logarithm of quasi rent per 
employee. Finally λa, δt and ρs are a set of areas, time and sector dummies respectively, 
while φi represents the individual fixed effect in fixed effects estimations.   
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In the first specification, as benchmark estimates, we perform OLS estimates to 
derive the impact of quasi rents per worker on wages including only observed individual 
and firm characteristics. We then perform the same estimation adding dummies for 
national contracts that indicate for each workers the specific national contract he is 
subject to (among 60 major contracts). This allows us to take into account the relevance 
of the national level of bargaining in Italy. Previous empirical studies instead generally 
used industry dummies (Guertzgen, 2009, Rusinek and Rycx, 2008). However, we claim 
that using national contracts, available in the INPS data, improves the quality of the 
approximation of the first level of bargaining, given that the collective bargaining occurs 
at the contract level and not at the industry level. 
Since an important concern in our analysis is to tackle the issue of unobserved 
individual heterogeneity that can bias the OLS estimates, we then carry out fixed effects 
estimations (Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2010, Martins, 2009, Arai and Heyman, 2001, 
Margolis and Salvanes, 2001). Moreover, in order to control for the endogeneity of the 
profit variable (simultaneous determination of wages and profits), which can also be 
exacerbated by a fixed effects strategy (Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2010), we apply IV 
fixed effects techniques. As instruments, we use lagged profits (Blanchflower, Oswald 
and Sanfey, 1996, Arai 2003, Arai and Heyman, 2001) and lagged real sales per 
employee, which represents a proxy of the market power of the firm (Margolis and 
Salvanes, 2001). The underlying assumption is that past profits and real sales per 
employee are uncorrelated with current labour market conditions.  
We also apply the IV methodology to investigate the extent of rent sharing along 
various dimensions (occupation, gender, macroarea, sector of activity). 
4.2 Results 
Table 2 shows the OLS estimates of the impact of profits per employee on 
workers’ wages.
14 In column (1) only individual characteristics and firm size are 
included: the elasticity of wages with respect to profits is 6.8%. We also report the 
“Lester” range, which is equal to 27%, meaning that a worker who moves from a low-
profit firm to a high-profit one gets a wage increase of 27%. 
Column (2) shows the same estimates with the introduction of the national 
contract dummies. By comparing column (1) with column (2), we are able to assess how 
much of the rent sharing impact is related to the first level of bargaining. As expected 
coefficients estimates turn out to be reduced, but by a small amount. More precisely, the 
elasticity of wages with respect to quasi-rents per employee passes from 6.8% to 5.8% 
and the Lester range from 27% to 23%. This means that more than 80% of the rent 
sharing is determined within industries (more precisely within “national contracts”), 
which implies that rent sharing in Italy essentially takes place at the firm level (in line 
with Arai, 2003, and Arai and Heyman, 2001).
15  
                                                 
14 We use clustered standard errors by firm, as suggested in Moulton (1990).  
15 As for the other variables in the estimations, coefficients are as expected: wages show a concave 
relation in age and increase in the occupational category considered; there is also evidence of gender 
gap, while firm size exerts a positive impact on wages, consistently with the idea that firm productivity  
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However, by using OLS estimates it is not possible to control for the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, i.e. for the sorting of high-ability workers into high-profit firms 
(Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2010, Margolis and Salvanes, 2001, Arai and Heyman, 
2001, Martins, 2009). Therefore we run fixed effect estimates (Table 3 column (1)), 
where the elasticity of wages with respect to quasi rent is significantly reduced. In 
particular, it passes from 5.8% to 1.6% and the Lester range from 23% to 6%. This 
finding points out that the sorting of workers is important and has to be taken into 
account when analyzing the relationship between profits and wages.  
 
Table 2: OLS estimates of wage on Quasi-Rent 
(1) (2)
Gender -0.2208*** -0.1965***
[0.0026] [0.0024]
Age 0.0286*** 0.0308***
[0.0008] [0.0007]
Age Squared -0.0002*** -0.0003***
[0.0000] [0.0000]
White Collar Dummy 0.3501*** 0.3150***
[0.0030] [0.0028]
Firm Size 0.0205*** 0.0179***
[0.0011] [0.0010]
Quasi Rent  0.0680*** 0.0580***
[0.0014] [0.0012]
Constant 5.1912*** 5.0710***
[0.0197] [0.0319]
National Contracts Dummies no yes
Time Dummies yes yes
Area and Sector Dummies yes yes
N. Observations 287,749 287,749
R Squared 0.43 0.50  
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by firms. 
 
Nonetheless, fixed effects estimates have to be taken with caution since the likely 
endogeneity of profits (due to the possible simultaneous determination of wages and 
profits) could entail an underestimation of the extent of rent sharing, which can be 
exacerbated by a fixed effect strategy (Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2010). In order to 
address this issue we apply IV fixed effects estimations techniques. As instruments, we 
use the lagged values of both profits per employee and real sales per employee. We 
claim that, on the one hand, lagged values of profits are likely to be correlated with 
current values of profits while they are uncorrelated with current wages (as in 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996, Arai 2003, Arai and Heyman, 2001). On the 
                                                                                                                                        
and wages are positively related with firm size (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006, Krueger and Summers, 
1988, Brown and Medoff, 1989).  
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other hand, we use lagged values of real sales per employee as a proxy for the market 
power of the firm, which is correlated to profits and -we assume- uncorrelated to 
current wages (as in Margolis and Salvanes, 2001). The IV analysis (column (2) of Table 
(3)) confirms the validity of the instruments chosen: the F-test on instruments weakness 
is rejected and the Sargan test concerning overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected 
at the 10% level.  
Results of the IV estimates (column (2) of Table (3)) confirm that the extent of 
rent sharing was severely underestimated in previous fixed effects estimations. In 
particular, the elasticity of rent sharing is now around 6% with “Lester” range equal to 
24%. This finding is consistent with previous empirical evidence (Hildreth and Oswald, 
1997, Abowd and Lemieux, 1993, Van Reenen 1996, Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2010) 
and underlines that endogeneity is a very relevant concern in the profit-wage 
relationship.  
 
Table 3: Fixed effects and IV estimates of wages on Quasi-Rent 
(1) (2)
Gender --
Age 0.0444*** 0.0363***
[0.0009] [0.0020]
Age Squared -0.0003*** -0.0003***
[0.0000] [0.0000]
White Collar Dummy 0.0895*** 0.0771***
[0.0042] [0.0066]
Firm Size 0.0158*** 0.0218***
[0.0010] [0.0023]
Quasi Rent  0.0161*** 0.0617***
[0.0007] [0.0057]
Constant 4.6311*** -
[0.0269]
National Contracts Dummies yes yes
Time Dummies yes yes
Area and Sector Dummies yes yes
N. Observations 287,749 151,203
N.Individuals 84,019 38,874
Methodology Fixed Effects IV Fixed Effects
F-test 428.86
Sargan test (P_value) 0.264  
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by firms. In the IV estimation instruments are lagged log- Quasi-Rents and lagged log real sales per 
employee. 
 
To sum up, our results show that after controlling for endogeneity, sorting and 
first level of bargaining, Italian employers share a not negligible amount of their profits 
with their workers.
16  
                                                 
16 Note that, as underlined in different works (see for instance Hildreth and Oswald, 1997), rent sharing is 
a long-run relationship, while in the short-run a positive relationship between profits and wages might  
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4.3 Analysis of the Extent of Rent Sharing by Gender, Occupation, Sector, 
Macroarea  
In this section we investigate the extent of rent sharing across different 
dimensions. In particular, we compare males and females, blue collars and white collars, 
the industry sector and the service sector, and the three Italian macroareas. In order to 
perform such a task we perform the IV estimates adding an interaction term between 
the quasi-rent variable and a dummy indicating the particular feature in objects. The 
econometric specification is as follows: 
     (2) 
where QRj(i),t*DFi,t is the interaction term between quasi-rent and the dummy of 
interest (in turn Female dummy, White Collar dummy, Centre and South dummies, and 
Service dummies). All the other variables are as in previous specification.  
We begin by presenting the results for gender and occupation categories (Table 4). 
As for the estimation related to gender (column (1)), it can be seen that for males 
(benchmark category) the coefficient for quasi-rent is significant and slightly higher in 
magnitude than in previous estimates. In fact the elasticity is now equal to 7%, with a 
Lester range of 28%. When taking into account the interaction term between quasi-rent 
and the female dummy, there is strong evidence of gender gap since the coefficient is 
negative and highly significant, thus entailing than females on average enjoy 3.4% less of 
rent sharing than males (with a Lester range equal to 15%). This finding is consistent 
with previous empirical evidence on gender gap due to rent sharing (Nekby, 2003).  
As for occupation categories (column (2) of Table 4), there is also evidence of a 
not uniform extent of rent sharing. In particular, the rent sharing coefficient is equal to 
5% -with a Lester range of 20%- for blue collar workers (reference category), while it 
increases to 7.5% -with Lester range of 30%- when taking into account white collars. 
This evidence point out that high skilled workers are better able to capture rents from 
their employers than low skilled workers, in line with Arai and Heyman (2001). 
We now turn to analyze the extent of rent sharing by other two important 
dimensions. We take into account the heterogeneity across areas, which is a very 
relevant issue in the case of Italy characterized by strong regional unbalances, and the 
difference across economic sectors. The results of the analysis by areas, defined as 
North (reference category), Centre and South, are shown in column (1) of Table 5. We 
can see that the estimated coefficient of rent sharing for the Northern regions is equal 
to 5.9% -with Lester range of 23%-, which is not significantly different from the one of 
the Centre regions, i.e. the interaction term with the Centre dummy is not significant. 
Quite surprisingly however, the interaction term with the South dummy is positive and 
                                                                                                                                        
be due to short-run frictions. However, as also pointed out by Van Reenen (1996), in our analysis it 
seems unlikely that firms are willing to pay wages above their market values for eight years (our time 
span) only because of frictions, and therefore we interpret our findings as evidence of rent sharing in 
line with bargaining theories.   
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significant and it is also quite high in magnitude: on average in Southern regions the 
degree of rent sharing is higher than in the rest of Italy of around 4.8%.
17 
As for the difference between sectors of economic activities, we present the 
results for the industry (reference category) and the service sector (column (2) of Table 
5). In the industry sector the degree of rent sharing is on average around 5% -with 
Lester range of 19%-, slightly lower than the average for the entire sample. The 
interaction term between rent sharing and the service sector is positive and significant, 
meaning that in the service sector the extent of rent sharing is higher of around 3%.  
Overall, these estimates have shown that the degree of rent sharing is very 
heterogeneous across the dimensions considered. In particular higher rents are enjoyed 
by those workers who are males, who are white collars, who work in the service sector 
and who are located in the South of Italy.  
 
Table 4: IV Estimates of wages on Quasi-Rent by gender and occupation  
(1) (2)
Gender       -       -
Age 0.0364*** 0.0362***
[0.0020] [0.0020]
Age Squared -0.0003*** -0.0003***
[0.0000] [0.0000]
White Collar Dummy 0.0775*** 0.0119
[0.0066] [0.0269]
Firm Size 0.0216*** 0.0218***
[0.0023] [0.0023]
Quasi Rent  0.0716*** 0.0526***
[0.0062] [0.0065]
Quasi Rent * Female Dummy -0.0342***
[0.0127]
0.0233**
[0.0092]
National Contracts Dummies no yes
Time Dummies yes yes
Area and Sector Dummies yes yes
N. Observations 151,203 151,203
N.Individuals 38,874 38,874
Methodology IV Fixed Effects IV Fixed Effects
F-test 217.33 215.27
F- test interacted variables 75.84 177.14
Sargan test (P_value) 0.5593 0.567
Quasi Rent * White Collar Dummy
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by firms. Instruments are lagged log- quasi rents and lagged log real sales per employee. 
                                                 
17 Note that though the coefficients estimates are higher in the South of Italy, the increase in wages due to 
rents might be compensated by the fact that average quasi rents in the South are lower than in the rest 
of Italy.  
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Table 5: IV estimates of wages on Quasi-Rent by area and sectors 
(1) (2)
Gender --
Age 0.0365*** 0.0366***
[0.0020] [0.0020]
Age Squared -0.0003*** -0.0003***
[0.0000] [0.0000]
White Collar Dummy 0.0772*** 0.0772***
[0.0066] [0.0067]
Firm Size 0.0234*** 0.0230***
[0.0025] [0.0023]
Quasi Rent  0.0592*** 0.0498***
[0.0059] [0.0058]
Quasi Rent * Centre Dummy -0.0057
[0.0140]
Quasi Rent * South Dummy 0.0478*
[0.0278]
0.0326***
[0.0082]
National Contracts Dummies no yes
Time Dummies yes yes
Area and Sector Dummies yes yes
N. Observations 151,203 151,203
N.Individuals 38,874 38,874
Methodology IV Fixed Effects IV Fixed Effects
F-test 179.26 219.52
F- test interacted variables 1 27.44 156.63
F- test interacted variables 2 11.24
Sargan test (P_value) 0.6246 0.147
Quasi Rent * Service Sector Dummy
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by firms. Instruments are lagged log Quasi-Rents and lagged log real sales per employee. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we make use of a unique matched employer-employee database to 
show the existence of a significant degree of rent-sharing in Italy for the period 1996-
2003. We show that around 15% of rent sharing derived by OLS estimates is actually 
captured by the first level of bargaining. We also point out that the sorting of worker 
plays a crucial role since it significantly dampens the rent-sharing coefficient, thus 
underlining the need of using individual level panel data for the analysis of the 
relationship between profits and wages. Finally, endogeneity has also proved to be a 
very important concern since fixed effects estimates suffer from severe underestimation, 
in accordance with the related literature. All in all, after controlling for first level 
bargaining, sorting and endogeneity, we find out estimates of rent sharing in Italy of 
around 6% with Lester range of 24%. Further, looking at the relationship between rents 
and wages across different dimensions, we show that the extent of rent sharing is not 
homogeneous. In particular, this is on average higher for those workers who are males,  
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who are white collars, who are employed in the service sector and who work in the 
South of Italy.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Characteristics of the match between AIDA-INPS (1996-2003) 
Universe of 
Job-Year 
Observations
Matched      
Job-Year 
Observations
Panel 
Estimation 
Sample 
Number of Workers 205,933 123,462 84,019
Real weekly wage 415.19 443.51 429.38
Age 36 37 37
Females 0.37 0.33 0.30
White collars and Manager 0.38 0.39 0.37
Number of Firms 204,937 67,624 50,555
Firm size (INPS)  2,446 3,068 370
Firm size (AIDA) 2,828 374
Real profit per employee (1000s euro) 31.34 9.54
Quasi Rent per employee (1000s euro) 144.47 21.25
Real sales per employee (1000s euro) 318.51 250.64
Number of Records 1,204,049 564,373 288,782 
The Universe of Job-Year Observations refers to the original INPS database, with workers aged between 15 and 64, 
employed in standard labour contracts (blue collars, white collars and managers) and working in the industry and service 
sectors. The Matched Job-Year observations refer to the fraction of the INPS database which has been merged with the 
AIDA database (with no any outlier cleaning). The Panel Estimation Sample has been constructed by using the longest 
available contract for each worker each year. Data have been further cleaned by dropping outliers (observations for which the 
difference in absolute value between the firm size reported in AIDA and the firm size reported in INPS was higher than 
200 and extreme observations below (above) the 1st (99th) percentile of wages and profits per employee variables) and 
considering the 60 major national contracts. 
 